INTRODUCTION
Low power consumption and security solutions built into Bluetooth led to the current situation where significant fraction of cell phones have their Bluetooth interfaces on all the time [1] . With the possible emergence of applications that involve mobile-to-mobile exchanges, the number of mobile phones with Bluetooth interfaces in discoverable mode could further increase. But, are we putting the little privacy that we have left at risk, by carelessly leaving our devices discoverable?
Mobile operators store customers' location records in CDRs. It is commonly believed that some phone manufacturers also collect location information. But, while we put a certain amount of trust in mobile operators, most of us would feel uncomfortable knowing that somebody unauthorized collects similar data. That would allow someone malicious to learn when we are outside our homes; advertising companies could get insight into our interests, etc. But how can anybody record my mobility, especially if I have a non-GPS phone?
Let's assume for a second that someone infected a population of mobile phones with a piece of malicious software. Such software can force phones to log Bluetooth contacts with other phones [3] . Additionally, it can make GPS equipped phones log their locations. The recorded information can then be uploaded to a central location via data connection. A phone bot like this one could allow reconstruction of non-GPS phones' mobility (infected or not) as their locations can be estimated from the contacts with the GPS equipped phones.
We perform data mining analysis of two data sets. Our initial results show that even simple algorithms allow reconstruction of coarse mobility for a significant fraction of mobile devices present in the data sets.
RELATED WORK
Previously proposed approaches for wireless nodes localization exploit contacts with fixed reference points and knowledge of history, and their focus is location prediction. In [5] localization of nodes in 802.11 wireless networks is studied. The authors use information available at the link-layer of the 802.11 networks to train a Bayesian network and to calculate location. In [4, 6] the authors focus on wireless sensor networks.
In contrast, our focus is mobility reconstruction. We use no learning or prior knowledge and we obtain nodes' locations from contacts with mobile reference points.
SYSTEM AND METRICS
The existing malware for mobile phones is capable of stealing data and logging GPS coordinates or Bluetooth neighbors [2] . It propagates via Bluetooth, email, MMS, memory cards or infected applications. We assume that a certain population of mobile phones is infected by malicious software that forces the Bluetooth interface to stay visible and to periodically run the neighbor discovery mechanism. The recorded contacts are logged and uploaded to a central server via the phones' data connections. Some of the infected phones are equipped with GPS receivers; we refer to them as anchors. In addition to logging contacts, they log and upload their locations. Our goal is to determine if the opportunistically collected contacts are sufficient to reconstruct the mobility of the tracked devices, i.e. the infected non-GPS phones. We are interested in two measures:
• Mean localization error is the average distance between real and estimated locations of tracked devices.
• Mean inter-anchor time is the average interval between two consecutive contacts, which occur between a tracked device and any of the anchors.
LOCALIZATION ALGORITHM
We design an algorithm that does not require training and knowledge of contact history. The algorithm exploits the fact that a contact between a tracked device and an anchor roughly determines the location of the tracked device, as the location of the anchor is known and the Bluetooth range is ∼ 10m. Additionally, we assume that all the devices move at moderate speeds.
For these reasons, we consider the location of a tracked device d 1 to be known at time t iff: (i)
USED DATA SETS AND RESULTS
We evaluate our algorithm and assumptions using two data sets. The first one was collected by 20 nodes, during a three day hiking trip. The hikers were moving through a large region in disorderly fashion. Their devices periodically logged Bluetooth contacts and GPS coordinates. The second data set is a two-week contact trace collected at the university campus by 60 mobile devices (for 10 of them GPS records exist).
We present only a part of our results for the first data set. The availability of GPS records for all devices in this data set allows us to estimate the localization error. When calculating the estimated locations of tracked devices we apply the following strategy: We select 5 The average inter-anchor times for different values of parameter ∆t are shown in Figure 1 . Increasing the value of ∆t from 0s to 20s allows for "indirect" contacts between tracked and anchor devices (as defined in Section 4) and significantly increases the number of location entries for the tracked devices. Further augmentation of ∆t brings little improvement.
Some tracked phones can be localized with higher precision than the others. For this reason, we calculate the localization error quantiles. Figure 2 contains the quantiles for ∆t = 80s (medians, 25th and 75th percentiles (box edges), extreme points (whiskers) and outliers (crosses)). We see that 50% of tracked devices can be localized within 300m and 70% within 800m.
